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Article
Reasonable Men?
ANN C. MCGINLEY
After the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII, lower courts used the reasonable person standard
to measure whether the behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute
a hostile working environment. Cultural and radical feminists objected to the
reasonable person measure, and many supported a reasonable woman standard,
which the Ninth Circuit adopted. Because of its tendency to essentialize how
women would react, many feminists soon abandoned their support for the
standard. A number of circuits, however, continue to use the reasonable woman
or reasonable victim standards.
Most of the scholarship concerning the proper standard of reasonableness
assumes male perpetrators and female victims. There is no legal scholarship that
deals with the question of a male victim of a female perpetrator. A recent Ninth
Circuit female-on-male harassment case raises important issues concerning the
reasonable woman standard.
This Article develops multidimensional masculinities, a new legal theory, to
reconsider sexual harassment law as it relates to male victims. Through an
examination of the recent Ninth Circuit case, it demonstrates that applying a
reasonable man standard to male victims would establish a preferred standard of
masculinity that may harm men, women, and society in general. Most likely, the
Article proposes, the standard would mimic the concept of “hegemonic
masculinity,” the most powerful ideal form of masculinity in society. This ideal
form of masculinity would judge too harshly those men who may be most
vulnerable to other-sex and same-sex harassment: men who do not live up to
gender stereotypes.
This Article proposes a shift to a new universal standard for determining
whether workplace behavior is sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile
working environment. This standard inquires whether the victim’s response is a
reasonable one considering not only the various identity factors of the victim, but
also the workplace, and the social and individual context in which the harassing
behavior occurs.
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Reasonable Men?
ANN C. MCGINLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
The law in the United States uses the reasonable person standard in a
variety of disciplines, including constitutional law, torts, criminal law,
commercial law, and employment discrimination.1 Depending on the area
and the particular case, the standard plays different roles. In negligence
*

William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Williams S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. J.D., 1982,
University of Pennsylvania Law School. Thank you to Sara McCollum and the Connecticut Law
Review staff for their excellent work on this Article. Special thanks to Nancy Levit, Nancy Dowd,
Elaine Shoben, Jeff Stempel, and Naomi Schoenbaum for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this Article. Thanks also to Martha Fineman, Frank Rudy Cooper, John Kang, Val Vojdik, Rachel
Rebouche, Mary Anne Case, Camille Gear Rich, and Noah Zatz for comments on presentations I made
of this paper. Jeanne Price, the Director of the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at Boyd School of Law,
UNLV and David McClure and Chad Schatzle, library professors at the Wiener-Rogers Law Library,
gave me frequent, excellent and tireless support on this project. I presented different versions of this
paper to audiences at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting in June 2011, the Labor and
Employment Law Scholars Colloquium in Fall 2011, Suffolk University Law School’s Faculty
Colloquium in Fall 2011, the University of Florida Workshop on “The Man Question” in Fall 2011, the
Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network in Winter 2012, and the University of San
Diego School of Law Faculty Colloquium in Spring 2012. I give my heartfelt thanks to the audiences
of those presentations for all of the help I received on this project. I also thank Deans John White and
Nancy Rapoport of the William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV, for their support, both financial and
professional.
1
See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative
Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1234 (2010) (discussing the different aspects of the law
that utilize the reasonable person standard); see also Paula Abrams, The Reasonable Believer: Faith,
Formalism, and Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1537 (2010) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s new “reasonable observer” test in determining whether the government had violated
the Establishment Clause); Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1455, 1457 (2010) (discussing the cultural influences on fact-finders’ views of what
a “reasonable person” would do when faced with perceived threats); Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some
Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1351, 1352 (2010) (discussing the prominence of the objective “reasonable person” standard in
tort law); Caroline Forell, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort Law,
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401 (2010) (discussing the use of the “reasonable person” standard in tort
and criminal law); Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in the
Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1481, 1499
(2010) (discussing the Court’s differential treatment of police officers and lay persons in determining
whether they acted as reasonable persons); Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the
Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435 (2010) (discussing the
“reasonable person” standard in criminal law); Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable
Person in Context, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2010) (discussing the “reasonable
person” standard in economic transactions).
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and criminal law, for example, it determines the culpability of the
defendant, including the availability of a justification or defense.2 In Title
VII law, it has a different purpose: it examines the plaintiff’s story in light
of community norms to determine whether the defendant’s (or its agent’s)
alleged behavior creates a hostile working environment. A plaintiff in
these cases must prove that the plaintiff subjectively experienced a hostile
working environment and that the gender or sex-based behavior was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of
employment3 of a reasonable person.4
Thus, the reasonable person standard in hostile work environment law
plays a perspectival rather than a culpability-determining function.5 Unlike
in negligence law, where the reasonable person standard measures whether
the defendant acted tortiously by breaching its duty of care to the plaintiff,
in employment discrimination hostile work environment law, the
reasonable person standard analyzes whether the victim’s reaction to the
environment was reasonable. While this standard indirectly establishes
whether the defendant’s alleged behavior is culpable, the primary focus is
on the alleged victim’s perception of the behavior, and whether a
reasonable person under the circumstances would have a similar reaction.6
2
Moran, supra note 1, at 1238, 1250. Where the defense of comparative negligence or
comparative fault exists, the fact-finder will examine the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s behavior.
This is different from the perspectival approach in sexual harassment cases because it measures how
the plaintiff’s behavior contributed to the injury, not whether the plaintiff’s reaction to the behavior
was reasonable. More similar to sexual harassment claims are the intentional infliction of emotional
distress cases where the victim’s response is relevant. If there is sufficient notice to the defendant
about a person’s vulnerability to emotional injury, the defendant may be liable for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Where there is an allegation of sexual assault, the plaintiff’s consent to the
behavior is usually a defense, but inadequate consent will nullify the defense. There are two parts to
proving inadequate defense: (1) abnormality of the victim making her unable to consent effectively;
and (2) notice of the abnormality to the defendant. See, e.g., Reavis v. Solminski, 551 N.W.2d 528,
538 (Neb. 1996) (noting the two types of effective consent). While this latter situation resembles an
examination of reasonableness in sexual harassment law, it is more similar to an examination of
unwelcomeness in a sexual harassment case than the reasonableness of the reaction of the plaintiff.
3
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (using sexual harassment as an
example to explain how the abuse must have altered the conditions of employment in order for it to be
actionable).
4
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining the application of the
reasonable person standard).
5
See Moran, supra note 1, at 1259 (discussing the origins of the perspectival use of the
reasonable person standard).
6
Although reasonableness of the plaintiff’s behavior in responding to the defendant’s alleged
harassment is considered—along with the reasonableness of the employer’s behavior—at a later stage
if the defendant employer asserts an affirmative defense in a case of supervisor harassment of a
subordinate, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998), that is not the examination of the plaintiff that I am discussing here.
Rather, I discuss whether a reasonable person would view the behavior as creating a hostile working
environment itself, not whether the plaintiff could have corrected or avoided the environment if she had
reported it to her employer.
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Not all jurisdictions use the reasonable person standard, however.
After the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a form of
discrimination under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,7
many lower courts used the reasonable person standard to measure the
presence of a hostile working environment.8 Both cultural and radical
feminists objected to the reasonable person measure in hostile working
environment cases,9 however, because in their view the reasonable person
standard was, in reality, based on what a reasonable man would do.10
Cultural feminists argued that the standard did not take into account the
biological and social differences between women and men; radical
feminists concluded that the use of a male norm ignored the power
advantages that men had over women.11 These concerns led many
feminists to support a reasonable woman standard, which the Ninth Circuit
adopted in Ellison v. Brady.12 A number of other courts followed.13 But
feminists soon became dissatisfied with the new reasonable woman test;
they argued that the reasonable woman standard essentializes women by
not taking into account the differences among women based on race, class,
national origin, sexual orientation, and other identity factors.14 Some
7

477 U.S. at 73.
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 49
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1202 (1989) (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986));
see also Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp. 1336, 1350, 1350, n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying the
reasonable person standard but stating that courts take into account “gender-based differences” in using
this standard).
9
Kathryn Abrams, The Reasonable Woman: Sense and Sensibility in Sexual Harassment Law,
DISSENT, Winter 1995, at 48–49.
10
See id. at 49 (“Both groups bridled at the possibility that women’s perspectives would be
described in terms simultaneously applicable to men.”); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal
Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398,
1404 (1992) (“[T]he standard purports to be universal, to include all ‘mankind,’ and in practice courts
have applied it to women as well as men.”).
11
Abrams, supra note 9, at 49.
12
924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991).
13
See, e.g., Gray v. Genlyte Grp., Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 137–38 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying the
reasonable woman standard under Massachusetts law); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d
95, 116 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying the reasonable woman standard under New Jersey law); Torres v.
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997) (using the reasonable woman standard in a Title VII suit); cf.
Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, 192 F.3d 310, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998),
permits taking into account identity characteristics of the victim). But see Brennan, 192 F.3d at 318
(using the reasonable person standard in majority opinion).
14
See MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 276–81 (2003) (discussing the evolution of the
reasonable woman standard and the subsequent challenges to this notion by feminists); Cahn, supra
note 10, at 1405–06 (noting that feminists also challenged the concept of reasonableness as gendered
because it is based on rationality and excludes emotion); id. at 1415–17 (noting that the reasonable
woman standard is problematic because it establishes women as victims, cannot accommodate the
experiences of all women, and focuses on the victim rather than the actions of the perpetrator).
8
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feminists also condemned the standard because they believed that it
reinforces the view that women are marginal workers by assuming that
women are different from, and inferior to, men.15 Others argued that
although using a gendered standard may give some victories to women, the
reasonable woman standard is problematic because it leaves intact a system
of male privilege.16 Another believed that the reasonableness aspect of the
test would itself preserve male power, and that adding women to the test
did not resolve the tendency of the test to confirm the status quo.17
All of these debates assume male perpetrators and female victims.
Subsequently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,18 the
Supreme Court held that male (and presumably, female) victims of samesex harassment have a cause of action under Title VII if they prove that the
harassment is severe or pervasive and occurs “because of . . . sex.”19
Scholars and courts have paid almost no attention, however, to the
situation of a male victim of a female coworker’s sexual advances.
A recent Ninth Circuit female-on-male harassment case, EEOC v.
Prospect Airport Services, Inc.,20 raises important issues concerning the
standard for female-on-male harassment, and for that matter, male-onfemale and same-sex harassment. In Prospect Airport Services, a man
alleged that a female coworker sexually harassed him over a number of
months, and that their employer did virtually nothing to stop it. When the
plaintiff brought suit, the federal district court commented that the plaintiff
himself had admitted that most men would welcome this type of behavior
and the court granted summary judgment to the defendant employer.21 The
Ninth Circuit panel reversed, chiding the district court for its attitude
toward the male defendant.22
15
See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 469
(1997) (“As Guido Calabresi and others argue, this asymmetry means that the reasonableness inquiry
reinforces majority dominance. Implicitly it posits a norm in which men and majority groups occupy
the center and others the periphery.” (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE
LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 22–23 (1985))).
16
Stephanie M. Wildman, Ending Male Privilege: Beyond the Reasonable Woman, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 1797, 1806 (2000) (reviewing CAROLINE A. FORRELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER
OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN (2000)).
17
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness in
Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1218 (1990) (concluding that the reasonable person or
reasonable woman tests “create a false sense of security . . . reinforcing the idea that legal analysis can
be neutral and objective”).
18
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
19
Id. at 80–81.
20
621 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
21
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72904, at *16, *22 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
22
Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d at 997 (“[T]he district court decision noted that [the
plaintiff] ‘admits that most men in his circumstances would have ‘welcomed’ [the female coworker’s]
advances. But that is a stereotype and welcomeness is inherently subjective . . . .”).
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While it seems to make sense to consider the identity characteristics of
the victim in assessing whether a reasonable victim would find the
harassing behavior severe or pervasive, it also seems odd to hold individual
male victims to a higher standard than that applied to individual female
victims. The reasonable woman standard was established to assure that
courts and juries would not impose male sensibilities (or the lack thereof)
on female employees who are alleged victims of sexual harassment in the
workplace.23 When the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman
standard in Ellison v. Brady, and other courts followed, courts and
commentators assumed that sexual harassment victims were exclusively
women. For this reason, no one advocating for the reasonable woman
standard anticipated the standard that would apply to future male victims.24
Because of this failure of forethought, it would be odd to apply a
reasonable man standard reflexively to a male victim without considering
the potential repercussions of doing so.
A major concern about applying a reasonable man standard to male
victims is that the law would establish a preferred standard of masculinity
that may harm men, women, and society in general. Most likely, the
standard would mimic the concept of “hegemonic masculinity,” the most
powerful ideal form of masculinity in society.25 This ideal form of
masculinity is often unachievable and would therefore judge too harshly
those men who may be most vulnerable to other-sex and same-sex
harassment: men who do not live up to male gender stereotypes.26
Moreover, masculinities research demonstrates that aggressive and
competitive masculine norms harm not only men but also women who are
compared to the male standard.27
By the same token, the reasonable woman standard has serious
drawbacks when assessing harassment of many women: it assumes only
one proper response from women, but there is no question that different
women, depending on the myriad axes of their identities, experiences, and
23
See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878–79 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that if the court did not
take into account the perspective of the victim, the law would reinforce the current levels of
discrimination, noting a number of sources that demonstrate that women generally react differently
from men to sexual advances, and adopting the reasonable woman standard to protect female
employees from harassment and employers from hyper-sensitive employees).
24
See MORAN, supra note 14, at 276–81 (discussing the literature on sexual harassment, which
deals exclusively with female victims).
25
Michael S. Kimmel, Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction
of Gender Identity, in FEMINISM & MASCULINITIES 182, 184 (Peter F. Murphy ed., 2004). For a more
thorough discussion of masculinities research, see Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L.
REV. 359, 364–78, 380–83 (2004).
26
See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment “Because of
Sex,” 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151, 1163 (2008) (“Our culture . . . exclude[s] men from power who do
not live up to the normative definition of masculinity.”).
27
See id. (“Our culture . . . exclude[s] women from power because they lack masculinity . . . .”).
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the context of the situation, have varying responses to the same harassing
behavior. Many of these responses are reasonable.
Prospect Airport Services raises a number of other questions: whether
it is possible to have a fair standard that applies uniformly to male-onfemale, female-on-male, and same-sex harassment; whether an objective
standard should consider identities and experiences of the alleged victims
together with context of the work situation; and whether the standard
applied in these cases makes a difference to the outcome. Prospect Airport
Services allows us to consider all of these questions. Because Prospect
Airport Services features the atypical situation of a man alleging that a
female co-worker’s behavior created a sexually hostile work environment,
it is an excellent vehicle for reexamining the standard for determining
whether a hostile working environment exists under Title VII.
To be clear, this is not a case comment; the case itself is not that
important or groundbreaking. Rather, I use the case because its unusual
fact pattern allows us to examine a problem in sexual harassment law
through a different lens and to use the newly acquired perspective to solve
a legal problem.
In doing so, I am developing multidimensional masculinities theory
(“MMT”). Frank Rudy Cooper and I introduced the concept of MMT and
coined the term in Masculinities and the Law: A Multidimensional
Approach.28 Multidimensional masculinities theory is both substantive
and methodological. Its theoretical foundations derive from feminist legal
theory, critical race theory, queer theory, intersectionality theory, and
multidimensionality theory.29 As a substantive matter, MMT combines
research
on
masculinities
with
multidimensionality
theory.
Multidimensional masculinities theory draws on intersectionality theory’s
insight that persons often have more than one identity that affects their
treatment. For example, black women are treated differently than white
women and black men. Black women belong to two identity groups that
are subordinated, and their treatment is not merely the composite of these
two types of subordination. The combination of racism and sexism makes
black women’s experience qualitatively different from that of white
women or black men.30 Multidimensionality theory accepts this premise,
and additionally explores a person’s identities combined with the context
of the situation. It allows us to go beyond the intersections of gender with
28
Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Multidimensionality, and Law: Why
They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 1
(Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012).
29
Id. at 2.
30
See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 (1991) (explaining that women of
color are a product of both race and gender and that their experiences do not appear in the discourses of
feminism or antiracism).
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other identity factors such as race and sexuality, and to consider the
context in which the behavior occurs.31 For example, while black women
may be members of two subordinated groups and, as a result, may suffer
more discriminatory treatment in many workplaces than black men,32 the
reverse is true in law enforcement. Even though black men belong to one
subordinated group—blacks—and one non-subordinated group—men—
when walking in a dark alley at night and faced with law enforcement,
black men occupy a worse position than black women. Black men, unlike
black women, are considered dangerous, and are often stopped by police
and/or arrested merely because they are black men.33
As to methodology, MMT enables us to “shift the lens” through which
we examine the law and its effects.34 Ordinarily, we shift the lens by
examining a case or situation through a different identity category such as
race or gender. Prospect Airport Services permits a lens shift to reconsider
sexual harassment law, a law ordinarily applied to protect women, as it
relates to male victims.35 The lens shift offers a fresh view of the
stereotypes underlying the behaviors of men and women in the workplace
and reveals the gendered notions incorporated in the judges’ opinions and
in the legal standards themselves. This new perspective provides valuable
insights that clarify the law’s effects on male and female victims of othersex and same-sex harassment, and can lead to the proposal of new theories,
justifications for, and interpretations of the law.36

31
Athena D. Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revealing Progressive Black Masculinities, in
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 78, 83–84.
32
See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano, A Masculinities Theory Analysis, 33 HARV.
J.L. & GENDER 581, 603–10 (2010) (explaining the hierarchy of race, class, and gender in fire
departments); Janice D. Yoder & Patricia Aniakudo, "Outsider Within" the Fire House: Subordination
and Difference in the Social Interactions of African American Women Firefighters, 11 GENDER &
SOC'Y 324, 334–36 (1997); Janice D. Yoder & Lynne L. Berendsen, "Outsider Within" the Firehouse:
African American and White Women Firefighters, 25 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 27, 30–32 (2001).
33
See Athena Mutua, The Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black Masculinities, in
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 78, 79; Frank
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinities: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity
Performance and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 853, 875–79 (2006) (describing the myth of the
“bad black male”). The example of Trayvon Martin who was gunned down while walking home from
the store in Florida is instructive. If it is true that he was shot, at least in part, because he was black, it
seems that it was not only his race that caused his demise. It was the combination of his race and his
gender that put him at risk. See Charles M. Blow, From O.J. to Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2012, at
A17 (detailing the dangers of being a black youth).
34
See Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in MASCULINITIES
AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 25, 40 (advocating the use of
masculinities theory to “shift the lens” to see the law’s assumptions and its effects more clearly).
35
See EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2010) (“This is a sexual
harassment case in which a male employee was a victim of a female co-worker.”).
36
See NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUESTION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 1 (2010)
(urging feminists to “ask ‘the man question’” to reveal “how gender functions to subordinate some or
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part II analyzes the court opinions in
Prospect Airport Services, explains MMT further, and considers how
MMT may contribute to an understanding of Title VII sexual harassment
law. Part III examines the history of the “reasonable person” and
“reasonable woman” standards and proposes a shift to a new universal
standard for determining whether workplace behavior is sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile working environment. This standard, which
derives in large part from MMT’s focus on context, inquires whether the
victim’s response is a reasonable one considering not only the various
identity factors of the victim, but also the workplace and the social and
individual context in which the harassing behavior occurs.
The Article concludes that using MMT to shift the lens in sexual
harassment cases facilitates the development of a better substantive
foundation to justify Title VII sexual harassment law regardless of whether
the perpetrators and the victims are men or women, of different sexes, or of
the same sex. An MMT approach leads to the development of a new, more
universal standard to determine objective and subjective reasonableness
that takes into account gender, race, and other identity factors in the
context of organizational and social power, as well as individual
experiences and vulnerabilities.
II. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENTS AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL
MASCULINITIES THEORY
A. Shifting the Lens: A Case Study of EEOC v. Prospect Airport Services,
Inc.
Rudolpho Lamas began work as a passenger service assistant for
Prospect Airport Services at McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas,
Nevada in April 2002, and was soon promoted to lead passenger service
assistant.37 His job was to assist passengers with disabilities by pushing
them in wheelchairs to the gates. Lamas, a religious man and a recent
widower, testified that soon after he began the job, a married female coworker, Sylvia Munoz, began to make sexual advances toward him. Over
a period of the next few months, Munoz gave Lamas three love notes and a
partially nude photograph of herself. Her notes invited a sexual
relationship with Lamas; one note stated that Munoz was having “crazy
dreams” about Lamas and Munoz in the bathtub, offered to do a body

all of most men, as well as how men consciously and unconsciously accept privilege with its patriarchal
dividend as well as its costs”).
37
The facts of the case described in this section, EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d
991 (9th Cir. 2010), are described in the light most favorable to the employee, Lamas, because they are
recited in response to a motion for summary judgment by the employer. See id. at 993.
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massage and stated, “I do want you sexually and romantically!”
From the beginning, Lamas told Munoz that he was not interested, and
he asked her to stop her advances. He also reported his discomfort on
many occasions to supervisory personnel at Prospect Airport Services,
including the Assistant General Manager and the General Manager. His
supervisors made some efforts to stop Munoz’s advances; his immediate
supervisor, Ronda Thompson, and the General Manager, Dennis Mitchell,
evidently had a meeting with Sylvia Munoz to tell her to stop harassing
Lamas.39 But to no avail. Munoz continued to solicit Lamas sexually; she
made comments to him such as “hey, hey” or “whew, whew,” when he
walked by or licked her lips or simulated a “blow job.” Once she kissed
him on the cheek.40
Munoz began to harass Lamas every day, and had co-workers deliver
messages asking Lamas for dates and stating that Munoz was “going to
get” Lamas eventually.41 Because of his failure to respond, co-workers
began to speculate about Lamas’s sexual orientation and they teased him,
asking if he was gay.42
Lamas testified that he felt “constant pressure” as a result of Munoz’s
and his other coworkers’ antics.43 Lamas began to see a psychologist about
his distress; he felt helpless and cried a great deal.44 His employer noticed
a decline in his work. Months earlier, Prospect had promoted Lamas and
had assigned him to the Southwest concourse in an attempt to save the
company’s contract with Southwest Airlines because Prospect considered
him to be the best performer; now Prospect demoted him.45 Finally, in
June 2003, Prospect Airport Services fired Lamas, citing his poor attitude
and unwillingness to give quality customer service.46
38

38

Id. at 994.
See Deposition of Dennis Mitchell at 77–86, Exhibit C to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72904 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), ECF No. 31-5; Affidavit of Ronda Thompson, Exhibit 8 to Declaration
of Wilfredo Tungol in Support of Plaintiff EEOC's Opposition to Defendant Prospect's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 50-4, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904.
40
Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas at 70, 109, 113, Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF Nos. 31-1 to 31-2.
41
Id. at 44, 50–51, 53, 100–01.
42
Id. at 167.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 167–68.
45
Deposition of Dennis Mitchell, supra note 39, at 97–98. The case brought by the EEOC is
limited to a hostile work environment claim and does not include a cause of action for his demotion and
firings in retaliation for reporting harassment. Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas, supra note 40, at 18–
19.
46
Exhibit 19 to the Deposition of Rudolpho Lamas, Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 31-4, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904. In her deposition testimony in this suit, Sylvia Munoz denied many of the
39
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Lamas filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that defendant Prospect Airport Services
had tolerated a sexually hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.47 In response to the charge, the EEOC
concluded that Lamas had been subjected to a sexually hostile work
environment, and it filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nevada. After discovery, the defendant filed a motion for
summary judgment and the federal district court granted the motion.48
Concluding that the behavior failed to create a hostile work environment,
the district court stated, “Lamas admits that most men in his circumstances
would have ‘welcomed’ the behavior he alleged was discriminatory, but
that due to his Christian background he was ‘embarrassed.’”49 By judging
Lamas’s reaction in comparison to that of “most men,” the court apparently
equated the “reasonable man’s” reaction to that of “most men in [Lamas’s]
circumstances.” In other words, Lamas’s reaction was unreasonable
because it did not conform to that of “most men.”
In the alternative, the district court announced that the employer was
not liable for the harassing behavior because even though the plaintiff
complained on many occasions to his supervisors, Lamas never filed a
formal complaint of sexual harassment.50 Moreover, the court noted that
Lamas did not complain further to his employer about the continuing
harassment after Lamas’s supervisor and the General Manager met with
Sylvia Munoz to warn her to stop harassing Lamas.51 Thus, according to
the district court, even if the harassing behavior continued to occur, the
employer was not liable because it had no notice of the alleged acts
creating the hostile work environment that occurred after the meeting with
Munoz.52 The court, therefore, effectively disregarded Lamas’s testimony
concerning the harassing acts occurring after the date of the supervisors’
meeting with Munoz.
Lamas’s deposition testimony raised the question of ongoing,
pervasive behavior by both Sylvia Munoz and their co-workers. He
testified that the harassment escalated to daily activities by Munoz and by
other coworkers, that he complained on numerous occasions to the
supervisor, his Assistant Manager and the General Manager, and that he
facts alleged by Rudolph Lamas and claimed that Lamas was interested in a sexual relationship with
her. See generally Deposition of Sylvia Munoz, Exhibit D to Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, ECF No. 31-6, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 72904.
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
48
Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904, at *22.
49
Id. at *16.
50
Id. at *17.
51
Id. at *20.
52
Id. at *20–21.
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sent a letter to the General Manager complaining about a number of
problems at work, including continuing harassment.53 While the defendant
testified that there were no further complaints, the court declined to decide
the factual question but then later drew inferences in favor of the
defendant’s position. At that time, the court concluded that Lamas’s letter
to the General Manager did not refer to continuing harassment—even
though the letter states, “I still feel harassed in many ways and the past
problems continue[]”—because the plaintiff’s testimony that he
complained frequently was not sufficiently specific.54
The district court decision was problematic. Once Mitchell, the
General Manager, and Thompson, Lamas’s immediate supervisor, were on
notice that Munoz was harassing Lamas and that the behavior was
unwelcome, they should have investigated the situation and remained
vigilant about further harassment. It is the employer’s responsibility, once
it has notice of the harassing behavior, to stop the harassment and promptly
remedy the situation.55
While the defendant argued below that the employer should not be
liable because Lamas made no formal sexual harassment complaint to his
employer, and the district court agreed, the district court’s conclusion is
clearly wrong. There is no question that Lamas informed at least three
company managers on four separate occasions about Munoz’s ongoing
sexual advances and asked them to correct the situation. Despite this
notice, the company made little effort to fix the problem. The one meeting
between Lamas’s supervisors and Munoz resulted in little or no change,
and Munoz continued to harass the plaintiff on a daily basis, as he testified
at his deposition. Moreover, as Lamas resisted Munoz’s advances, many
of their co-workers, at Munoz’s direction, approached Lamas to encourage
him to take Munoz up on her offers. Lamas testified that as he continued
to resist, his co-workers began to ridicule him and question whether he was
gay.56 This evidence, if credited, as the court must do on a motion for
summary judgment, raises genuine issues of material fact concerning
whether the employer’s response to Lamas’s complaint was adequate to
stop and remedy the harassment.
On appeal, a panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.57 It concluded that “a
jury could reasonably find that Prospect knew about the harrassment, and
that its response was inadequate.”58 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was
53

Deposition of Rudolpho A. Lamas, supra note 40, at 70–75.
Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904, at *22.
55
See id. at *13 (“In order for an employer to be liable for the conduct of an
employee-coworker . . . the plaintiff must prove that . . . the employer knew or should have known of
the harassment but did not take adequate steps to address it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2010).
57
Id. at 1001.
58
Id.
54
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critical of the district court’s stereotypes and assumptions about men who
face sexual harassment at work. The Ninth Circuit concluded that female
and male sexual harassment victims should be treated equally, and that
stereotypes that men desire women to make sexual advances toward them
have no place in analyzing sexual harassment law.59
Both courts in Prospect Airport Services addressed the substantive
requirements of a hostile work environment suit in the context of a man
who alleges that the behavior of a female co-worker created a hostile
working environment that altered the terms or conditions of his
employment. The hostile work environment law requires that the plaintiff
prove that the behavior: (1) was unwelcome; (2) occurred because of the
plaintiff’s sex; and (3) was subjectively and objectively sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s
employment.60 Both courts discussed, especially with reference to the
alleged victim’s status as a man alleging a hostile work environment, the
unwelcomeness requirement, and the severe or pervasive requirement.
Neither court discussed the “because of sex” requirement at length.
1. EEOC v. Prospect Services, Inc. and Unwelcomeness
Unwelcomeness is a subjective standard, but in situations where it may
be ambiguous whether the plaintiff welcomes the behavior of the harasser,
courts often require some notice to the alleged harasser. Notice may be as
simple as saying “no” to invitations or, in some cases, ignoring the
harasser’s advances.61 There was at least a question of fact whether Lamas
welcomed Munoz’s behavior. He testified at his deposition that her
advances were unwelcome and that he told her to stop on numerous
occasions. Moreover, it is undisputed that Lamas told his supervisors at
least four times about Munoz’s advances and asked that they be stopped.
The district court noted, however, that Lamas admitted that most men
would welcome the behavior.62 While it appears that the lower court made
this statement to support its view that Munoz’s behavior did not rise to the
level of objectively severe or pervasive, the EEOC cleverly argued that the
district court’s statement revealed its belief that, as a matter of law, the
behavior was welcome. On appeal, the EEOC essentially argued that the
lower court used an objective, rather than a subjective standard of
59
See id. at 997 (“It cannot be assumed that because a man receives sexual advances from a
woman that those advances are welcome.”).
60
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
61
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment, 53
ALA. L. REV. 733, 751 (2002) (“[W]here the subject of the harassment either attempts to ignore the
conduct or declines to specifically address it, the rule seems to leave the default solution—that the
conduct is not unwelcome—undisturbed.”).
62
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72904,
at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 2010).
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unwelcomeness. The EEOC claimed error because there was significant
evidence in the record that Lamas did not welcome Munoz’s advances.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took its cue from the EEOC and gently
chided the district court for its discussion of the unwelcomeness
requirement.63 Explaining that unwelcomeness is “inherently subjective,”
the Ninth Circuit stated that it is irrelevant whether most men would
welcome sexual advances from a woman.64 In a colorful (and perhaps
unconsciously misogynistic statement), the Ninth Circuit stated:
It would not make sense to try to treat welcomeness as
objective, because whether one person welcomes another’s
sexual proposition depends on the invitee’s individual
circumstances and feelings. Title VII is not a beauty contest,
and even if Munoz looks like Marilyn Monroe, Lamas might
not want to have sex with her, for all sorts of possible
reasons. He might feel that fornication is wrong, and that
adultery is wrong as is supported by his remark about being a
Christian. He might fear her husband. He might fear a
sexual harassment complaint or other accusation if her
feelings about him changed. He might fear complication in
his workday. He might fear that his preoccupation with his
deceased wife would take any pleasure out of it. He might
just not be attracted to her. He may fear eighteen years of
child support payments. He might feel that something was
mentally off about a woman that sexually aggressive toward
him. Some men might feel that chivalry obligates a man to
say yes, but the law does not.65
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lamas “unquestionably established a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether the conduct was welcome.”66 The
court noted that Lamas testified that Munoz’s advances were unwelcome,
that they made him cry, that he sought medical help to deal with his
anxiety caused by her advances, that he had no prior romantic or sexual
relationship with Munoz, that he never approached her, and that he told her
that he did not want a relationship with her. He explained his response by
referring to the recent death of his wife and his Christian beliefs.67
2. Severe or Pervasive
As noted above, Title VII requires that a sexually hostile working
63

Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d at 998.
Id. at 997.
65
Id. at 998.
66
Id.
67
Id.
64
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environment be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms or
conditions of employment. This standard is both subjective and objective:
it requires a showing that the individual plaintiff subjectively experienced
the environment as severe or pervasive and that a reasonable plaintiff
would similarly so experience the environment.68 There is considerable
debate over what constitutes a “reasonable plaintiff.” In negligence law,
some conclude that a “reasonable person” should track the behavior of an
average person while others argue that a “reasonable person” indicates an
ideal person in the same exterior circumstances.69 In most situations in
negligence law, the reasonable person standard does not take into account
the identity factors of the victim but it does consider the surrounding
circumstances in determining what a reasonable person would do.70 In
employment discrimination law, however, because sexual harassment is a
tort suffered most commonly by women, and research demonstrates that
men and women often react differently to harassing behavior,71 a number
of courts consider the identity of the victim in determining whether he or
she reacted reasonably.72
Noting that the Ninth Circuit has in the past established the
“reasonable woman” standard in Ellison v. Brady,73 the district court in
Prospect Airport Services explained that more recent Ninth Circuit cases
used the “reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics”
standard to determine whether a particular environment is objectively
hostile.74 The district court noted that Lamas “admits that most men in his
circumstances would have welcomed” the woman’s advances and ruled
that a reasonable jury could not conclude that a reasonable person with the
68

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993).
See Laura A. Heymann, The Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1314
(2010) (“[T]he law constructs an ideal reasonable person as a standard by which to gauge the propriety
of a party’s conduct.”); Moran, supra note 1, at 1236 (“[T]he reasonable person . . . is most often the
common or ordinary man.”).
70
There are two exceptions in negligence law: (1) a person with a physical disability will be
expected to act as a reasonable person with the same disability; and (2) a child who is not engaging in
adult or dangerous activities will be expected to act as a reasonable child would under the
circumstances. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §§ 10(a), 11(a) (2010);
Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1358.
71
See Barbara A. Gutek & Maureen O’Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Woman
Standard, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 151, 155, 159–63 (1995) (concluding that there are small gender
differences in reactions to sexual harassment, but also concluding that the reasonable woman standard
is not helpful); Maureen O’Connor et al., Explaining Sexual Harassment Judgments: Looking Beyond
Gender of the Rater, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 69, 90–91 (2004) (finding a small differential based on
the gender of the rater, but concluding that findings of sexual harassment are more complicated than the
gender of the rater).
72
See infra notes 119–26 and accompanying text.
73
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
74
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72904, at *13 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007).
69
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same “fundamental characteristics” as the plaintiff would find the
harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive75 to alter the terms or
conditions of Lamas’s employment.76
Next, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the question of whether the facts
evidenced a working environment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive
from the perspective of “a reasonable victim” to alter the terms or
conditions of employment.77 The court acknowledged that not all romantic
proposals are illegal sexual harassment, and that merely offensive conduct
is not sufficient to create a hostile working environment. Here, the court
concluded that Munoz’s advances were not severe, but stated that “[t]he
required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the
pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.”78 Munoz’s repeated advances
combined with the employer’s failure to stop the conduct led the court to
conclude that Lamas had presented sufficient evidence to go to the jury on
the question of severity or pervasiveness.
3. Because of Sex
Because the behavior involved was sexually explicit and the alleged
harassment occurred between people of different sexes, both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit assumed that the harassing behavior occurred
because of Lamas’s sex. Courts follow a common route in Title VII sexual
harassment cases. In male-on-female harassment, courts assume that the
harasser’s purpose is to engage in a romantic or sexual relationship with
the alleged victim; they conclude that if the victim were not female, the
male harasser would not have harassed the victim. Thus, they conclude,
the behavior occurred because of sex.79
While in Prospect Airport Services the harasser’s true motives were
unclear, the facts suggest that the motive was sexual attraction. Following
the lead of the male-on-female harassment cases, both the district court and
the Ninth Circuit assumed that both harasser and victim were heterosexual
and that Sylvia Munoz would not have harassed Rudolpho Lamas had he
75
Id. at *13–16. The court mistakenly uses the term “severe and pervasive,” which is not the
correct standard, but it seems to consider severity and pervasiveness separately. The Supreme Court
has made clear that a hostile work environment exists if it is either severe or pervasive. Thus, one
incident, such as a rape or a grabbing of one’s crotch may be sufficient to meet the severity test, but
absent severity, a work environment can be hostile as a result of pervasive joking, sexual comments, or
the like. The less severe the behavior, the more pervasive it should be in order for it to constitute a
hostile work environment.
76
Id. at *16.
77
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010).
78
Id. (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)).
79
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80–81 (1998) (stating that in
male-female sexual harassment situations when the conduct involves implicit or explicit proposals of
sexual activity, juries and courts are reasonable to conclude that the proposals would not have been
made to someone of the same sex).
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been a woman because her motive was to engage in a sexual relationship
with him. Of course, these assumptions ignore the possibility that the
harasser was bisexual or that Munoz engaged in sexual advances in order
to ridicule him. The assumptions also may misunderstand the coworkers’
motives in harassing Lamas. The facts suggest that at least the coworkers’
harassment of Lamas was based on Lamas’s failure to live up to gender
stereotypes of how a “real man” would respond to sexual advances of a
female coworker. But under the standard assumptions of the courts, there
was sufficient evidence that the behavior occurred because of sex for the
case to go to the jury on this issue. Whether these standard assumptions
adequately support a theory of sexual harassment as sex discrimination is a
different question that I discuss in a separate article.80
B. Multidimensional Masculinities: Methodology and Substance
1. Theoretical Background
Masculinities research has recently received attention from feminist
legal scholars and critical race scholars because it explains why men
engage in behaviors that are harmful to women and how competitive
behaviors among men of different races, classes, and sexual orientations
may also be gendered and may harm both men and women. 81
Masculinities theorists use the term “masculinities” in the plural to denote
that masculinity is not a fixed, natural result of a person’s biological sex.82
In contrast, masculinities scholars posit that masculinity is socially
constructed and that men achieve their masculinity through performances,
or interaction with others (especially other men), and that there are varying
ways to perform masculinity.83
Masculinities theory recognizes that certain practices we identify as
“masculine” are normative. Masculinity prescriptions affect men and
women of different races, ethnic backgrounds, classes, and sexual
orientations in different ways. For many men, defining oneself as
“masculine” requires proof of two negatives: that one is not feminine or a

80

Ann C. McGinley, Because of Sex (forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
See DOWD, supra note 36, at 57–71 (describing the relationship between feminist legal theory
and masculinities scholarship). Over the past five years, at least twenty significant masculinities and
law articles have been published; a comprehensive list of the scholarship regarding law and
masculinities scholarship through 2009 can be found in Frank Rudy Cooper, “Who’s the Man?”:
Masculinities Studies, Terry Stops, and Police Training, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 671, 672–74 &
n.7 (2009). See also Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV.
777, 798–99 (2000); McGinley, supra note 26 (using masculinities theory to analyze workplace
harassment occurring “because of sex”).
82
See, e.g., Ethel Spector Person, Masculinities, Plural, 54 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOC.
1165 (2006) (explaining that masculinity cannot be regarded as a single entity).
83
See DOWD, supra note 36, at 26.
81
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girl, and that one is not gay. Most men, however, cannot achieve the
hegemonic masculinity ideal,85 and they respond by constantly struggling
toward achieving the ideal86 or by reacting to the ideal by engaging in
subversive or alternative forms of masculinity.87 Whatever form their ideal
masculinity takes, while men as a group are powerful, individual men see
themselves as powerless because of the constant competition to prove
themselves to other men. Men attempt to gain control, a struggle that is
rife with fear, shame, and emotional isolation.88 These performances are
homosocial—men engage in them to prove to other men that they are
masculine.89
The performances often involve mistreatment of
nonconforming men and of women. These behaviors are particularly
evident in exclusively male environments or workplaces that are
traditionally dominated by men.90 Men engage in masculine behaviors to
construct and perform their masculinity at work.91
The term “masculinities” also refers to masculine structures. In the
workplace, these structures create barriers to entry and promotion and also
affect the terms and conditions of employment based on gender, as well as
race, national origin, class, and other individual characteristics. Law is a
masculine structure that creates opportunities for those exhibiting the
preferred masculinity performances and barriers for those who do not. The
federal district court in Prospect Airport Services, for example, interpreted
legal requirements such as severity or pervasiveness in keeping with social
attitudes about the proper masculine performance in response to sexual
advances by women.92 This interpretation undermined the plaintiff in this

84
See id. at 62. As Kenneth Karst states, “The main demands for positive achievement of
masculinity arise outside the home, and those demands reinforce the boy’s need to be what his mother
is not. In the hierarchical and rigorously competitive society of other boys, one categorical imperative
outranks all the others: don’t be a girl.” Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 503 (1991).
85
See Cliff Cheng, Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction, 1 J.
MEN’S STUD. 295 (1999); R.W. Connell & James W. Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinity:
Rethinking the Concept, 19 GENDER & SOC'Y 829, 838 (2005) (discussing ambiguities in the concept of
hegemonic masculinity and associated embodiments of it).
86
See Kimmel, supra note 25, at 186–87 (discussing how men seek to prove their manhood to
other men).
87
See, e.g., David L. Collinson, ‘Engineering Humor’: Masculinity, Joking and Conflict in Shopfloor Relations, 9 ORG. STUD. 181, 185 (1988) (observing masculinities displayed by blue collar
workers in shop culture).
88
DOWD, supra note 36, at 31; see John M. Kang, The Burdens of Manliness, 33 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 477, 496 (2010) (explaining that “manliness” is forced upon men in the military and that men
are punished for being shameful and cowardly).
89
Kimmel, supra note 25, at 186–87.
90
See McGinley, supra note 26, at 1184 (describing hazing and gang rape in fraternities).
91
Id. at 1223–24, 1229.
92
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., No. 2:05-01125-KJD-GWF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72904, at *6 (D. Nev. Sept. 27, 2007) (dismissing the workplace sexual harassment claim of a male
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case, reinforced other men’s superior masculinity, and set the standard for
performance of masculinity for “real men.”
As Cooper and I explain in Masculinities and the Law: A
Multidimensional Approach, MMT considers how masculinities combine
with race, sexual orientation, class and gender in different contexts, and
uses multiple lenses to demonstrate how identity concepts are embedded in
the law and how the law furthers identity hierarchies.93
Multidimensionality theory (absent masculinities) is rooted in
intersectionality theory’s insight that unique identities form at the
intersection of categories of identities.94
When combining
multidimensionality theory with masculinities theory to create MMT,
Cooper and I rely on two main concepts: (1) identities are co-constituted;
and (2) identities are context-dependent.95 Because identities are coconstituted, race, gender, class, sexual identity, and other identities are
inextricably intertwined, and identity is a product and result of these
relationships. Moreover, the meaning of co-constituted identities differs
depending on the settings or the context. The same individual, for
example, will discover that different aspects of his identity will be “more
or less salient over time, in different settings, and depending on what other
identities are in the mix.”96 Thus, persons with the same combination of
identities will be treated differently depending on the cultural context.97
Perhaps most important, none of these identities or contexts is fixed or
static. Rather, identity performance is just that: a performance that
changes depending on the context of the situation.98 Numerous examples
abound. A black man will be treated differently and will react differently
if he is walking in a white neighborhood on a dark night than if he is going
to a bar in a predominantly black neighborhood. A white gay male will be
treated differently at a gay bar in a gay section of a major U.S. city than if
he enters a conservative Christian church in the deep South. And, the
differential treatment in different contexts will also affect the person’s
employee against his female co-worker because “most men in [the employee’s] circumstance would
have ‘welcomed’ the behavior”), rev’d, 621 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2010).
93
McGinley & Cooper, supra note 28, at 6–7.
94
See Crenshaw, supra note 30, at 1241–42 (1991) (discussing how recognition of social
problems, such as battery and rape, as systematic has characterized the political identities of minority
groups).
95
See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 28, at 8 (referring to Athena D. Mutua, The
Multidimensional Turn: Revisiting Progressive Black Masculinities, in MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW:
A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 78, 78–79 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley eds., 2012)).
96
Id. at 8–9.
97
Id. (citing Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251 (2002)).
98
See Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1268–76
(2000) (discussing how members of outsider groups must perform their identities in workplaces
depending on what qualities the culture values).
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behavior in the different contexts.
This ever-moving concept of identity is, of course, hard to define, but
it is helpful in understanding workplaces. Workplaces are dynamic
locations where organizational power interacts with sociocultural power
and power derived from interpersonal relationships. These power
differentials, in turn, interact with identity performances of individuals that
change depending on group, context, and culture. If the law governing
workplaces remains static, without accommodating these rapidly changing
differences in understanding of identity and performance within context, it
will rely on outdated and imperfect notions of human behavior.
2. Applying MMT to Prospect Airport Services
Multidimensional masculinities theory may also help explain
Rudolpho Lamas’s reaction to Sylvia Munoz and his other coworkers’
harassment. As noted above, masculinities theorists explain that although
men are powerful as a group, individual men often feel powerless and
vulnerable as a result of the pressure placed on them for their perceived
failures to live up to the hegemonic ideal of masculinity.99 As a result of
Munoz’s advances and Lamas’s lack of interest in engaging in a sexual
relationship with her, other coworkers ridiculed Lamas and questioned his
sexuality.100 Lamas testified that he felt helpless and began crying
frequently.101 What was unusual about Lamas’s response is that he
admitted his vulnerability to himself, his managers and a psychologist by
telling them about Munoz’s advances and his negative reactions to them. 102
His employers and the district court compounded these feelings of
vulnerability by downplaying the importance of his complaints. These
feelings of vulnerability result from the necessity to prove one’s
masculinity continuously, and the fear and shame resulting from a belief
that one is not a “real man.”
But Lamas is not only a man. He also belongs to a number of identity
groups that, along with the context of the workplace, likely affected his
response and the behavior of others. Lamas is a dark-skinned Hispanic,
fundamentalist Christian man who, at the time of the harassing behavior,
had been recently widowed.103 Lamas was lonely and sad, and he did not
want to hurt anyone by complaining to management.104 This is hardly the
profile of a typical masculine man. Even assuming that Munoz was
initially sexually attracted to Lamas, once he showed his unwillingness to
99

See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2010).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 998.
104
Id. at 994.
100
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engage in a sexual relationship, Lamas’s superiors and coworkers treated
him as if he were not a “real man.” His immediate supervisor, Ronda
Thompson, never spoke to Munoz about her behavior and the General
Manager, Dennis Mitchell, did nothing more than tell Munoz that he did
not want to get involved in a personal situation. This admonition did not
stop the harassment. The Assistant General Manager told Lamas that he
should sing to himself, “I’m too sexy for my shirt.”105 In other words,
Lamas should have been flattered by Munoz’s advances. All signs were
that Lamas was not acting like a real man. A real man would have enjoyed
the sexual advance and taken Munoz up on it. A real man, even if he did
not enjoy it, would have handled the situation himself. He would not have
complained (“whined”) to his supervisors.
At Munoz’s encouragement, coworkers urged Lamas to go out with
her, and when he rebuffed her advances, they turned on him, questioned
whether he was gay, and questioned his masculinity.106 The coworkers’
behavior attempted to enforce a gender regime—that a man should accede
to a woman’s sexual advances, and that if he does not, he is not a real man.
Their mistreatment of Lamas occurred because of his sex—they pressured
him to act like a man, and when in their view he did not, they ridiculed him
for not being a real man. Although this behavior was not as severe as in
many cases, it was pervasive and, combined with Munoz’s advances and
the employer’s refusal to take the complaints seriously, caused Lamas
harm because of his failure to prove himself a real man.
Masculinities theory explains why the workplace environment was
problematic. It acknowledges that men as a group have power. But it also
recognizes that because of the pressure to prove masculinity and the
competition among men to perform and prove their masculinity, often
individual men feel powerless.107 This feeling of powerlessness appears to
describe Lamas’s predicament. Munoz marshaled the power of her
coworkers and employer to create a situation for Lamas that called into
question his very manhood. Given the pressure in society to conform to
gender roles, this pressure occurred because of Lamas’s sex and his failure
to live up to stereotypical gender norms of masculinity.
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates that we need to take into
account the complicated multidimensional identities of the plaintiff, his
individual vulnerabilities, his status at work, the workplace context, and
the location of organizational and social power in determining whether
Lamas’s reaction was reasonable. With the facts of Prospect Airport
Services in mind, the next Part discusses the proper standard for
105
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determining whether behavior creates an objectively severe or pervasive
hostile working environment.
III. REASONABLE MAN? WOMAN? PERSON? A REASONABLE RESPONSE
This Part begins with a short description of the reasonable person
standard in negligence law and moves to a brief history of the reasonable
person standard in Title VII. It then looks to recent Supreme Court cases
that encourage a contextual approach to Title VII law and adopts a
multidimensional masculinities analysis of the case study of Prospect
Airport Services to help determine a fair and workable standard in the Title
VII context. It then proposes a new standard for deciding whether a hostile
working environment exists.
A. Brief History of the Reasonable Person: Negligence and Title VII
The reasonable person standard, which was the “reasonable man”
standard in early common law negligence cases, has endured while
suffering intense criticism.108 While it “forms the centerpiece of the
standard of care in negligence and is at the heart of many of the criminal
law defenses,” it “is characterized by a lack of clarity about the exact
nature of the subjective and objective characteristics of the reasonable
person.”109 Despite significant speculation about whether the “reasonable
person” represents an ideal or the ordinary or common person, Mayo
Moran argues that it refers to the common or ordinary man.110 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts of 1965 used the term “reasonable man” to
define negligence, while the proposed final draft of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts shifted from reasonable man to reasonable person to avoid
the gendered term.111 Martha Chamallas believes, however, that gender
has once again become invisible because there is no explanation for the
shift from “reasonable man” to “reasonable person” and younger lawyers
may be unaware of the gendered history of the term.112 The Restatement
(Third) adheres strictly to the reasonable person standard and permits
deviance only for children and persons with physical disabilities.113 Thus,
there is little or no room, according to Chamallas, for a perspectival
approach to the reasonable person standard under the Restatement (Third).
108

See Moran, supra note 1, at 1235.
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See Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1357 (“[T]he Restatement (Second) used explicitly gendered
language, defining negligence as the failure to act as a ‘reasonable man under the circumstances’ . . . .
In contrast to its predecessor, the Restatement (Third) scrupulously uses gender-neutral language
throughout, relying on inclusive terms such as ‘person’ and ‘actor’.”).
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Certainly, it does not appear that one of the “circumstances” that juries and
judges should consider in determining whether the person was negligent is
his or her gender, race, national origin, or other similar identifying
characteristics. Nonetheless, Chamallas notes that critical theory has
argued for varying perspectives in tort law, but the research is complicated
about how gender affects tort law historically, and points to neither the
abandonment nor the retention of the reasonable person standard in tort
law.114
As Chamallas notes, there is slightly more opportunity for a
perspectival approach in the civil rights cases.115 Soon after courts began
to recognize sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII, it was
clear that courts would reject a unitary subjective standard; feminists
debated whether the objective test should be of a reasonable woman or a
reasonable person.116 Many argued that because a reasonable person
merely reflected the experiences of a reasonable man, courts should
employ a reasonable woman standard so that fact-finders would consider
women’s experiences in assessing whether a hostile working environment
existed.117 Other feminists disagreed. They argued that a reasonable
woman standard essentializes women’s experiences regardless of age,
disability, race, class, color, and experience. Thus, the standard would
become that of the most powerful woman—a reasonable able-bodied white
woman.118
The Ninth Circuit, in Ellison v. Brady,119 adopted the reasonable
woman (or victim) standard, concluding, “If we only examined whether a
reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, we would
run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers
could continue to harass merely because a particular discriminatory
practice was common, and victims of harassment would have no
remedy.”120 Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court used the reasonable
person standard, without explanation, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.121
Although the issue of the proper standard was before the Harris Court in
amicus briefs, the Court did not refer to the amicus briefs or explain
whether or not it was rejecting the reasonable woman standard. It merely
used the term “reasonable person” in passing. After Harris, federal courts
114
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116
See supra notes 7–16 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Id. at 878.
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510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII's purview.”).
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of appeals have continued to use a variety of standards, including the
reasonable person under the circumstances, the reasonable victim, and the
reasonable woman standard.122 The Ninth Circuit sometimes uses a
reasonable woman standard.123 At other times, courts in the Ninth Circuit
use a “reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics” or a
“reasonable person under the circumstances” standard.124 Some courts in
other circuits have also used the reasonable woman standard.125 In mixed
race and gender cases, a number of courts have held that the standard is
determined by the race and gender of the individual.126
Mayo Moran emphasizes that the reasonable person standard in sexual
harassment does not play a culpability-determining function, but rather a
perspectival function. She believes that this difference is important, and
she argues that in the context of sexual harassment, the reasonable person
standard, as adjusted to consider at least some of the individual
characteristics of the victim, plays a “corrective” function.127 Because
most judges are privileged and tend not to have experienced sexual
harassment from the perspective of the victim, a reasonable woman
standard, Moran argues, makes the judge think twice about his initial
reactions.128 Moran states:
122

See supra notes 12–14, 119–21 and accompanying text.
See Alvarado v. Fed. Express Corp., 384 F. App’x 585, 588 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
reasonable woman instruction was not erroneous); Manzo v. Laborers Int’l Union of N. Am., 348 F.
App’x 267, 268 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the reasonable woman standard); Davis v. Team Elec. Co.,
520 F.3d 1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); Conklin v. City of Reno, No. 3:08-cv-00452-LRH-RAM,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10735, at *7 (D. Nev. Feb. 5, 2010) (same); Spina v. Maricopa Cnty. Dep’t
Transp., No. CV-05-0712-PHX-SMM, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10153, at *7 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2010)
(same).
124
Craig v. M & O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047, 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (using both the
reasonable person with the same characteristics as the victim and the reasonable woman standard
interchangeably); Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (using the perspective
of a reasonable person with the plaintiff’s same fundamental characteristics).
125
See, e.g., Stephenson v. City of Phila., 293 F. App’x 123, 124 (3d Cir. 2008) (using the
reasonable woman standard); Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1089 (10th Cir.
2007) (same); Ivan v. Cnty. of Middlesex, 595 F. Supp. 2d 425, 450 (D.N.J. 2009) (same when
applying New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination); Kimber-Anderson v. City of Newark, No. 086309, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19720, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2011) (same); Mitchel v. Holder, No. C0800205MEJ, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21088, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (quoting Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998), but replacing the term “person” with “woman” to demonstrate
that it considered the reasonable person standard to permit an examination of gender).
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See, e.g., Caldwell v. Washington, 278 F. App’x 773, 776 (9th Cir. 2008) (using the
“reasonable African American woman” test); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th
Cir. 2004) (using the “reasonable African-American [wo]man” test); Woods v. Washington, No. C10117RSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5423, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 2011) (using the “reasonable man
in the plaintiff’s circumstances” test); Picouto v. W. Star Truck Plant Portland LLC, No. CV-08-807ST, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95355, at *28 (D. Or. May 27, 2010) (using the “reasonable Hispanic man
in [the plaintiff’s] position” test).
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[I]t seems plausible to understand the invocation of the
reasonable person, with its emphasis on the subjective
attributes of the individual claiming discrimination, as a kind
of corrective to the structural inequality that inevitably
plagues the adjudication of such claims. If understood in this
way, a deeper acquaintance with the experience of a
“reasonable person” in the position of the claimant may well
be the vehicle to encourage judges to be more reflective
about the implications of difference and disadvantage in the
meaning of events and to be accordingly more thoughtful
about the limits of their own experiences and intuitions in
such cases.129
Moran notes that the problem with the reasonable person standard,
without taking individual characteristics into account, is that it defines a
privileged person, rather than a disadvantaged one.130 To the extent that
the law should use the reasonable person standard to play a corrective
function with judges who are themselves privileged, it is necessary to look
at individual characteristics in defining the reasonable person. The
concern, Moran concludes, is that if the reasonable person is identified as
one who has the exact characteristics of the alleged victim, it may appear
that sexual harassment victims are making a plea for special treatment. 131
Moran nonetheless concludes that in the context of cases such as sexual
harassment, where equality concerns are at issue, the reasonable person
standard is proper only if it takes into account characteristics of the victim.
In other words, Moran advocates a reasonable victim or a reasonable
woman standard. In so concluding, Moran relies on Kathryn Abrams’s
approach which views the reasonable victim standard as an opportunity to
educate the judge and the jury about what it is like for women in the
workplace.132 In this way, the reasonable woman standard encourages the
fact-finder to take the perspective of the victim and to act as a reasonable
fact-finder with all of the necessary information.133 Abrams claims that
fact-finders should have four different types of information to assess sexual
harassment claims: (1) barriers that women have faced and continue to face
at work; (2) the role that sexualization plays in thwarting women in the
workplace; (3) the ways in which harassment can cause harm to women in
the workplace absent severe psychological damage; and (4) women
workers’ responses to sexual harassment.134
129
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Abrams explains, and I agree, that reasonableness itself is not
necessarily a problem. While reasonableness may encourage juries to
eschew considerations of emotion, a proper reasonableness standard does
not have to play this role. Instead, it can guide employers and forestall
remedies for “pretextual” or “idiosyncratic” responses,135 thereby lending
greater force and predictability to the law.
While I agree with Moran and Abrams that fact-finders should
consider individual characteristics, I have two concerns about their
analysis.
First, while their proposals take into account identity
characteristics and context because they talk of the reasonable victim or the
reasonable woman, they suggest that there is only one reasonable response
to a particular combination of characteristics and context. Second, because
they discuss the typical situation of the reasonable woman, their discussion
tends to ignore how their proposal would affect male victims of other-sex
harassment and all same-sex victims. My view is that only if we can find a
workable standard for all types of victims will women—the most common
victims of sexual harassment—be fully protected. Moran, Abrams, and
other feminist scholars’ exclusive focus on women as victims ignores the
blind spots that many have regarding gender norms. For example,
Abrams’s list of four types of information specifically deals with women’s
newcomer status in the workplace and the difficulty that women have in
the traditionally male environment of the workplace. These types of
information would not help a judge or jury to understand how male victims
in the workplace may suffer from the imposition of norms of masculinity.
Masculinities theories, however, may help judges and juries to
understand why certain men are vulnerable to harassment by coworkers or
supervisors.
Male and some female coworkers harass gender
nonconforming men for their failure to live up to masculinity norms. 136
These masculinity norms hurt not only the men who are judged by the
norms. They often exclude women from the workplace or result in their
harassment as well. Moreover, harassment based on masculinity norms is
often invisible to men.137 Thus, if judges (especially male judges) attempt
to use their own “common sense” or to allow the juries to use “common
sense” without permitting expert testimony on social facts concerning
gender norms, they may actually reinforce the very gender norms that
cause the harassment. Judges should permit expert testimony to explain to
135
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1210 (1989).
136
See Margaret S. Stockdale et al., Perceptions of the Sexual Harassment of Men, 5 PSYCHOL.
MEN & MASCULINITY 158, 164 (2004) (finding that men, as well as women who supported
hypermasculinity, were less likely than others to view certain workplace behaviors as sexual
harassment).
137
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the fact-finders how groups enforce gender norms at work (in the context
of the case before the jury). This evidence differs from the social
frameworks evidence rejected by the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes.138 Social frameworks evidence is the application of expert
testimony to a case for background and giving an opinion as to the
relevance of the social science evidence to the case at issue. Unlike the
social frameworks evidence condemned by the Court in Wal-Mart, social
facts evidence uses the same scientific principles used by scientists outside
of the litigation process. Professors Mitchell, Walker, and Monahan
explain social facts evidence:
[T]he expert applies scientific principles and methods to
case-specific data in the same way that the expert would use
scientific principles and methods to analyze data outside the
litigation context. When social scientific principles and
methods are used to develop opinions about the parties,
practices, or behaviors involved in a particular case, such
evidence has been referred to as “social facts.”139
This social facts evidence is admissible as adjudicative fact and will
help jurors to make their decisions using social science data rather than
mere common sense.140
Another problem of the proposed standards is that they create a
monolithic picture of the reasonable woman (or man, or person) and
assume that there is only one reasonable way to respond to a set of
harassing circumstances.141 While in negligence law it may make sense to
describe what a reasonable person should do in order to avoid harming
others or oneself, it is odd to assume that there is only one reasonable
reaction to others’ potentially discriminatory behavior. Moreover, many
factors, among them identity factors and context, will influence how
different people respond to similar behavior. Many of these varying
138

131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554 (2011).
Gregory Mitchell et al., Beyond Context: Social Facts as Case-Specific Evidence, 60 EMORY
L.J. 1109, 1113 (2011) (citation omitted) (distinguishing social facts evidence from social framework
evidence and arguing that social facts evidence should be admissible as adjudicative fact).
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See id. at 1117–18 (explaining that social facts differ from social authority and social
frameworks in two respects: “(1) social facts involve case-specific descriptive or causal claims,
whereas social authority and social frameworks involve general propositions about causation or about
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principles to case-specific data to reach descriptive and causal conclusions about the case at hand.”).
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In the Ninth Circuit, for example, some panels use the reasonable woman standard while
others use a reasonable person under the circumstances standard. Still others use the reasonable person
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text.
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responses are reasonable.
B. Context Matters
In cases decided after Harris, moreover, the Supreme Court has hinted
at a broader standard and has advocated the consideration of context, a
context that may include the victim’s identity.142 In a number of recent
Title VII cases, the Court has emphasized the importance of context in
determining whether a violation has occurred.143 This acknowledgement
that “context matters” suggests that the Court’s “reasonable person”
standard in Harris may permit consideration of the victim’s identity as one
factor among many in determining whether the victim’s reaction was
reasonable. Certainly, the Court encourages an understanding of context,
which multidimensional masculinities theory would also encourage.
For example, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,144 the
Court expressly noted the importance of context in determining whether
the behavior is actionable; it contrasted the situation of a football coach
who pats his player on the buttocks for encouragement as he goes out onto
the field (which is not sexual harassment) with a coach who pats his female
secretary’s buttocks (which is likely sexual harassment).145 The same
behavior, given the context and the identity of the potential victim, will
likely have different legal effect. The Court states that “[t]he real social
impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts
142
See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006) (stating that the
significance of a retaliatory act must be read in its context); Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454,
456 (2006) (finding that the meaning of words depends on their context); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998) (finding that courts must evaluate the context of an
action to determine if it constitutes sexual harassment); see also Chamallas, supra note 1, at 1367–69
(providing an overview of how the Supreme Court has permitted courts to use context to interpret what
constitutes “reasonable”). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue directly, in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court defined an objectively hostile work environment as one that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive. 510 U.S. at 21. It declined to address the question of
the validity of recently proposed EEOC regulations that specifically adopted both a reasonable person
standard and a victim’s perspective standard. Id. at 22–23 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed 29
C.F.R. 1609.19(c)) (1993)). The proposed EEOC regulation which was later withdrawn stated, “The
reasonable person standard includes consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s
race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.” 59 Fed. Reg. 51,396 (proposed 29
C.F.R. 1609.19(c)) (1993)).
143
See infra notes 144–55 and accompanying text (illustrating the examples where the Supreme
Court demonstrates such an approach).
144
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
145
Id. at 81–82 (1998). The football coach example may be an unfortunate one given the recent
scandals in men’s sports at Penn State and Syracuse Universities. E.g., Pete Thamel, Syracuse’s
Boeheim Stands by Assistant Accused of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2011, at B13; Mark Viera, A Sex
Abuse Scandal Rattles Penn State’s Football Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at A1.
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performed.” It encourages courts and juries to use “[c]ommon sense and
an appropriate sensitivity to social context” to distinguish between legal
and illegal behavior.147
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 148 the Court
defines what behavior amounts to a sufficient adverse employment action
to constitute retaliation. Here again, the Court adopts a context-rich
approach. The Court announced that an adverse employment action exists
if “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”149 The test is an objective one: how a reasonable person
would react. But, the Court notes that “[c]ontext matters,”150 and gives a
number of examples to illustrate its point. Those examples encourage the
fact-finder to consider the subjective situations of the individual plaintiffs
involved. For example, the Court states that changing an employee’s work
schedule “may make little difference to many workers, but may matter
enormously to a young mother with school-age children.”151 It suggests
that such a schedule change would be materially adverse to the young
mother with children. This conclusion relies on the victim’s identity as
well as the context of her situation at home.
In a third recent case, Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,152 the Supreme Court
again emphasized the importance of context. In Ash, the lower court had
held as a matter of law that an Alabama employer’s use of the term “boy”
denoted no discriminatory racial animus toward the two black men who
were denied promotions.153 The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
court’s conclusion that use of the term “boy” alone, without the qualifier
“black” or “white,” could never prove discriminatory animus and was
insufficient evidence to go to the jury.154 The Supreme Court stated, “The
speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context,
inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.”155
These cases suggest that the Supreme Court would not only permit, but
would also encourage a more nuanced approach to determining whether an
alleged sexual harassment victim’s reaction to harassing behavior was
reasonable. One concern, however, is the Court’s statement that fact146
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finders should use their common sense to decide these cases. While juries
ordinarily use common sense to make decisions, use of common sense in
an area where social gender norms are involved may lead to discriminatory
results.
Social norms can lead to erroneous assumptions and
misunderstandings concerning the motivations behind employees’s
behaviors and the reactions they produce in other employees. This may be
particularly true where the person judged is a member of a less powerful or
outsider group.156 Research shows that where men are subject to
harassment, views vary as to its severity based on the identity of the
harasser, the type of harassment, and the gender of the judge. For
example, psychological studies show that male participants generally
perceive female-on-male sexual harassment as less harassing than male-onfemale sexual harassment. Female participants, however, perceive both
types of harassment to be equal.157 Moreover, studies show that male
participants view different types of male-on-male harassment differently.158
They consider negative, hostile harassing behaviors by men directed at
other men less serious.159 These behaviors are coined “rejection-based”
sexual harassment.160 In contrast, male participants find sexual advances
by men toward other men more harassing and serious.161 These harassing
behaviors are deemed “approach-based” male-on-male harassment.162
Multidimensional masculinities theory’s instruction to use varying
lenses to view the situation may aid in understanding the dynamics.
Multidimensionality theory, like intersectionality theory, urges an antiessentialist look at identity and recognizes that multiple strands of our
identity interact to form the person, and that additionally, the individual’s
experiences vary as the context varies.163 Use of MMT should be explicit
in the courtroom. Judges should encourage juries to consider context, but
warn them that their first response may be a discriminatory one. Social
gender norms are very strongly held and often invisible to those who
believe in the norms. The judge should permit expert testimony of social
156
See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1132 (2008)
(noting that many outsiders have learned that performing at work exactly as white men does not shield
them from discrimination, and that outsiders are often penalized for the same minor deficiencies for
which insiders receive no penalty because the outsiders are much more visible and are the object of
stereotypes).
157
See Roger C. Katz et al., Effects of Gender and Situation on the Perception of Sexual
Harassment, 34 SEX ROLES 35, 38–40 (1996) (discussing the results of a statistical analysis on
harassment ratings as a function of group and situation); Stockdale et al., supra note 136, at 164–65
(discussing the results of a study on sexual harassment).
158
Stockdale et al., supra note 136, at 164–65.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 159.
161
Id. at 164–65.
162
Id. at 159.
163
See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text (discussing and explaining MMT).
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facts based on social science research specifically applied to the case so
that the jury can make an informed decision.164
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates the problem with using a
“reasonable woman” or “reasonable man” standard.165 Both standards tend
to rely on stereotypical views of how men and women should or would
react in response to a potentially harassing environment. The law,
however, should not enforce a gender regime based on stereotypes by
labeling particular male or female behavior “reasonable” based on how
men and women conform to societal gender norms. There is a wide array
of reasonable reactions to the same behaviors in the workplaces. While
biological sex and gender may to some extent affect an employee’s
reaction to behaviors in the workplace, other contextual factors such as
organizational power, social power, workplace dynamics, and an
individual victim’s vulnerabilities may determine whether the individual’s
response is a reasonable one.
Prospect Airport Services provides a good example. A “typical” male
coworker may not have been troubled by Sylvia Munoz’s behavior.166
Even if most men may not have welcomed the behavior, it is not likely that
they would have been intimidated by Sylvia Munoz’s advances. If
bothered by Sylvia’s advances, a “typical” man would likely have stopped
the behavior by responding in a forceful manner. Rudolpho Lamas,
however, was unable successfully to rebuff Munoz’s advances.167 Even
though he told Munoz to stop a number of times, she did not heed his
plea.168
Understanding the context of Lamas’s home life and the workplace
dynamics at Prospect would help explain to the jury why Lamas reacted to
Munoz’s advances as he did. Lamas attributed his discomfort with
Munoz’s behavior to his fundamentalist religion and his status as a recent
widower.169 This information alone explains in part why Munoz’s
behavior was difficult for him, but issues surrounding Lamas’s identity and
the context of the workplace dynamics could have been developed even
further. After Lamas refused to involve himself with Munoz, a number of
coworkers began to pressure him to go out with Munoz and began to
question his masculinity and his sexual orientation.170 His coworkers’
164
Mitchell et al., supra note 139, at 1154–55 (explaining the benefits of expert witnesses
carrying out empirical social research to support social facts).
165
EEOC v. Prospect Airport Servs., Inc., 621 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2010) (illustrating how the
“reasonable man” standard relies on stereotypical views of men).
166
See id. at 995 (discussing how Lamas's coworkers made remarks that he was gay because of
his reaction to Munoz’s advances).
167
Id. at 994.
168
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170
Id. at 995.
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teasing and his supervisors’ reaction to Lamas may have resulted from
beliefs that Lamas did not live up to masculine stereotypes. In other
words, they may have believed that Lamas should have handled the
situation himself, accepted Munoz’s advances, or shut up because only
non-masculine men complain about sexual harassment. Another possible
contextual reason for Munoz’s ability to harass Lamas is racial. Lamas, a
dark-skinned Latino male, may have had less power socially than Munoz, a
light skinned Latina, and Munoz’s and others’ attitudes toward Lamas may
have related in part to his color.
Prospect Airport Services demonstrates that the problem with the
standard lies in its conclusion that there is only one reasonable reaction to a
set of harassing circumstances. The standard should not measure a
“reasonable man” or a “reasonable woman” or even a “reasonable person.”
Rather, it should consider the context of the situation, including identity
factors of the victim, the fluid organizational and social power
differentials, and the various personal vulnerabilities of the victims to
determine whether the victim’s response in viewing the behavior as
harassing was reasonable. This should not be an onerous test. Once the
victim’s response is deemed potentially reasonable given the contextual
and identity factors at play, the focus should be on the employer’s response
to the behavior. Here, again, Prospect Airport Services is instructive. The
fact-finder should consider not only that Lamas was a man, but also that he
was a fundamentalist Christian who found Munoz’s behavior particularly
threatening, and that he was a recent widower who was still mourning his
wife’s death. But an understanding of the facts in Prospect Airport
Services reveals more. It appears that the injury to Rudolpho Lamas
occurred not only at the hands of his female coworker, Sylvia Munoz, but
also as a result of his employer’s refusal to stop the behavior, combined
with his fellow coworkers’ questioning of his failure to live up to their
standards of masculinity.
Courts have traditionally analyzed whether a hostile work environment
exists before analyzing the separate question of whether the employer is
liable for the environment, but in this case this approach was inadequate.
In fact, the employer’s refusal to step in and stop both Munoz’s and the
coworkers’ harassing behavior, and its attitude that Lamas should not take
the behavior seriously actually enhanced the seriousness of the behavior.
In essence, the employer’s behavior was an important part of the hostile
work environment itself. This behavior, therefore, is part and parcel of the
context of the situation that the fact-finder should consider in determining
whether Lamas’s working environment was hostile. In this case, the factfinder should have considered the employer’s reaction in determining
whether the behavior was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms
or conditions of the employee’s employment. Here, perhaps because the
employer believed that sexual harassment by a female coworker on a male
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coworker was less serious than the more common harassment by a male on
a female coworker, the employer failed to act and even ridiculed Lamas’s
reports of sexual harassment. His supervisor told him that he should be
singing, “I’m too sexy for my shirt,”171 and did not take Lamas’s report
seriously. This behavior, combined with the employer’s failure to stop the
harassment by Munoz and by fellow coworkers who questioned Lamas’s
sexual orientation, added to the severity and the pervasiveness of the
problem.
C. Proposal: A Reasonable Response
1. The Proposal
In determining the proper objective standard for a hostile working
environment, it is important to assure that we do not use men as a
measuring stick of how a reasonable person would react, and that we do
not engage in stereotyping when determining how men or women should
or do react to a harassing environment. To avoid these problems, the law
should allow fact-finders to consider variations in the context of the
workplace, it should take into account different lived experiences of the
victims, and it should reflect on power differentials at work and in society.
But, most importantly, a new standard should recognize that there is a
range of reasonable responses to the same set of behaviors. The standard,
rather than considering what a reasonable person, reasonable woman, or
reasonable victim would have thought, should look at whether the
plaintiff’s response was a reasonable one, given a number of factors. This
test is a totality of the circumstances test. It is important for judges and
juries to understand that the factors listed below are not elements and that
not all factors need be present for a hostile work environment to exist.
In determining whether the plaintiff’s response was reasonable, there
should be a two-part test, as there currently is.172 The first question, which
goes to the subjective element, would remain the same: whether the
behavior created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff as a
subjective matter.173 If the answer to this question is yes, the second
question is whether the plaintiff’s reaction was a reasonable one when
taking into account the workplace dynamics, the harassing behaviors, and
the plaintiff’s identity, experiences, and position at the workplace.174
Under the law as it currently stands, when considering this second
question, fact-finders focus only on the conduct itself. They consider the
171
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following:
•

Frequency of conduct;

•

Severity of conduct;

•

Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a
mere offensive utterance; and

•

Whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s
work.175

These are all important factors that help determine how serious or
severe or pervasive the conduct is, but they disregard the context of the
workplace, how power operates, and the victim’s identity and experiences.
Under the new proposed standard, the fact-finder should also consider the
following:
•

The personal identity of the plaintiff;

•

Circumstances at work or outside of work that make the alleged
victim vulnerable;

•

Relative power of the harasser(s) based on position at work and/or
social power;

•

Relative powerlessness of the harassee(s) based on position at
work and/or lack of social power;

•

Whether the individual alleging harassment is a social outsider;

•

Workplace dynamics; and

•

Workplace context.

This test has a number of advantages. First, it is flexible enough to
permit a uniform standard for all types of harassment, no matter who the
perpetrators and the victims are, but also to allow consideration of variable
factors in particular cases that go to whether an objectively hostile work
environment existed. The proposal has the benefit of retaining the
objective test, but also permitting the consideration of important
surrounding circumstances in determining whether a hostile working
environment existed.
2. Will the Proposal Make a Difference?
The final question is whether a “reasonable response” standard would
make a difference. Although there is no research on whether this new
standard would affect a fact-finder’s determinations, we can learn
175
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something from existing research on the reasonable woman standard.
Psychological studies demonstrate that women judge harassing behaviors,
at least those that are more ambiguous, as more severe or harassing than
men do.176 The difference between women and men is small, but fairly
consistent, and it does not exist where there is very extreme behavior. 177
This differential of perspective, along with men’s superior social and
organizational power and the reality that women represent the vast
majority of sexual harassment victims, led to the use of the reasonable
woman standard in some courts. But a question still remains as to whether
the use of the reasonable woman standard actually affects the results.
Research into whether the reasonable woman standard makes a difference
to the outcome remains inconclusive. A number of studies find that, when
clearly instructed on the different standards, those applying a reasonable
woman standard to a male-on-female harassment situation are slightly
more likely to find that sexual harassment occurred.178
But even these studies are not determinative. A number of the studies
use students as subjects;179 others use both students and adults;180 others
study court opinions to evaluate the effect of the reasonable woman
standard.181 But none of the studies accounts for all of the possible
variables that could affect the results in a real case. To evaluate these
studies, we must consider the effect of pre-trial and post-trial motions
decided by judges and the effect of deliberation on individual jurors’
decisions. Judges faced with motions for summary judgment and for
judgment as a matter of law regularly consider the standard and the facts to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, the judge’s view of how
the facts relate to the standard is very important to the result, and is often
Gutek & O’Connor, supra note 71, at 154–55.
Id. at 155.
178
See, e.g., Barbara A. Gutek et al., The Utility of the Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: A Multimethod, Multistudy Examination, 5 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 623 (1999) (finding a two percent increase in sexual harassment findings using
the reasonable woman standard); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment
Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548, 592–93 (2001) (finding the success rate of cases studied for a ten year
period was slightly higher using a reasonable woman standard, but the sample and results were too
small to be statistically significant); Elissa L. Perry et al., The Reasonable Woman Standard: Effects on
Sexual Harassment Court Decisions, 28 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 9, 22 (2004) (finding that using the
reasonable woman standard had a “positive, but weak, impact” on court decisions in a circuit with a
reasonable woman precedent); Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, How Do People Evaluate Social
Sexual Conduct at Work? A Psycholegal Model, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 75, 75 (2000) (studying how
men and women determine whether social sexual interactions reach the level of harassment proscribed
in state and federal statutes).
179
See, e.g., Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It
Matter?, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 633, 664 (2002) (finding that the standard made no
difference).
180
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determinative. During trial, where the jury is the fact-finder, the verdict is
not an individual determination, but rather the result of a group deliberative
process. When viewed in this light, we see that the empirical studies do
not necessarily reflect how decisions would be made in a real case. First,
the psychological studies measure the standard only in male-on-female
cases so, at most, they can predict how the reasonable woman standard
affects the typical male-on-female harassment case. Second, many of the
studies use undergraduate students as test subjects, and offer them a very
short description of the possible scenario. These studies give the students a
short description of the behavior and then instruct different groups of
students to use the reasonable person and the reasonable woman standards.
The individual students then rate whether they would find that the
particular behavior created a hostile work environment. The test
subjects—individual undergraduate students—differ widely from both the
judge and the jury. Like the judge, the undergraduates act alone in making
their determinations, but unlike the judge, they are not well informed about
the law and have no experience with these types of cases.182 Like the jury,
the students have little or no experience with the law, but, unlike a jury, the
students are not diverse in age and personal experience and they make their
own individual determinations without a deliberative process. The
undergraduate students’ responses, therefore, may not accurately reflect
whether an individual judge would conclude that a particular scenario is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment or
whether a jury, after deliberation, would conclude that it is.183
Other studies correct for some of these deficiencies by using both
students and adults as participants, and different means of communicating
the information to the test subjects. These studies, which use videotapes
and longer descriptions of cases that are taken from testimony in real cases,
are much improved over earlier studies and yield important results.184
Nonetheless, these studies still do not account for the role of the judge in
the decision or the role of the jury’s deliberative process in decision
making. There are a few studies that consider judicial opinions to
determine whether the reasonable woman standard makes a difference in
182
See Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils
of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 879–80 (2009) (discussing the finding that an
individual’s view of the facts depends heavily on personal characteristics).
183
Jury deliberations can have an effect on the outcome of trials. Research demonstrates that the
identity of the foreperson, the frequency of the polling of jurors, and other factors may affect the
outcome. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 690, 694–97 (2001); see also Mary R. Rose et
al., Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors’ Attention to the "Offstage" of Trials, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
310, 322 (2010) (discussing “offstage” comments made by jurors about parties, at least one of which
likely affected the outcome).
184
Gutek et al., supra note 178, at 604–07.
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the cases, but these studies, too, have difficulty replicating the trial
process. The Perry study, for example, looks only at published decisions
(including those published on Lexis-Nexis), does not consider any opinions
decided on pre-trial motions, and looks only at federal district court cases
where the judges served as fact-finders at trial.186 The Juliano-Schwab
study is broader in that it looks at both federal district court and federal
court of appeals opinions,187 and does not exclude opinions written in
response to pre-trial motions, but it does not control for the severity or
pervasiveness of the behavior.
Both studies of judicial opinions
necessarily omit the vast majority of cases that are resolved without filing a
claim, or are settled without a judicial opinion.188 Moreover, in both
studies of judicial opinions, it is difficult to tell whether the reasonable
woman standard causes the positive effect or whether the circuits using the
reasonable woman standard are more liberal in their approach to sexual
harassment cases.
Given this research and the lack of research on my proposed standard,
it is unclear whether a new “reasonable response” standard would have a
significant effect on the results in sexual harassment cases. At the very
least, however, the new approach should provide a corrective effect on the
judges. Because the new standard emphasizes that there are numerous
reasonable responses, it will take the focus off of the reasonableness of the
particular victim’s reaction, and place it more on the employer’s response.
Moreover, because it encourages a more contextualized approach, it would
encourage judges to use humility in relying on their own “common sense”
and would lead to admission of expert testimony providing social facts
testimony. Furthermore, it should encourage employers who are creating
policies to understand that their policies should anticipate that there is
more than one reasonable response to a particular set of behaviors. Finally,
it will provide an opportunity for further research into a more complex
understanding of how judges and juries interact and how those interactions
affect results in the context of a hostile work environment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION: FROM “THE MAN QUESTION” TO “THE WOMAN
QUESTION” 189
Prospect Airport Services, combined with an understanding of MMT,
185
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permits us to reconsider both the underlying theory of sex discrimination in
a hostile work environment case and the proper standard for determining
whether a hostile work environment exists. Using MMT to shift the lens in
sexual harassment cases encourages development of a better theory to
support Title VII sexual harassment law, regardless of the sex of the
perpetrator and victim. Essential to a theory of illegal sex discrimination
in a hostile work environment case is the use of organizational and/or
social power to create a sexually hostile or gender-hostile environment. A
multidimensional masculinities approach permits development of a new,
more universal standard to determine objective and subjective
reasonableness, a standard that takes into account gender, race, and other
identity characteristics of the victim, and the victim’s personal
vulnerabilities in the context of organizational and social power. The factfinder should also consider the employer’s response to the victim’s
complaints in determining whether a hostile work environment existed
because of the plaintiff’s sex. Clearly, the employer’s response plays an
important role in the implementation of organizational power to the ends of
creating a hostile work environment.
But this case tells us even more. After shifting the lens to ask “the
man question” we need once more to shift back to examine the woman
question. That is, masculinities theory is particularly useful in helping us
to understand our blind spots. It permits us to consider varying
possibilities where vulnerable men receive unequal treatment. It also
allows us to consider why groups of men (or men and women) may engage
in behavior that scapegoats less masculine men.
Shifting the lens and applying a multidimensional view helps us to
understand why women are still subject to serious workplace harassment.
If men and/or women cannot tolerate a workforce where some men are not
masculine in the traditional sense, there will be no room in those jobs for
women as equals either. Worshipping hegemonic forms of masculinity has
a flip side: besides harming men who do not live up to the ideal,
worshiping masculinity denigrates working women.190

190
Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 18 (1995) (stating that characteristics
that are seen as masculine are more highly valued and that characteristics seen as feminine are devalued
and are unacceptable in males).
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